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IRS Captive Insurance Tax Rulings - IRS Safe Harbor Rulings for Captive Insurance
An Overview of IRS Captive
Insurance Revenue
Rulings
On December 30, 2002 the
US Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) issued three revenue rulings and a new revenue procedure in
Internal Revenue Bulletin 2002-52.
Specifically, the three revenue rulings were
(Rev. Rule.
2002-89,
Rev. Rule 2002-90 and
Rev. Rule 2002-91) and the new revenue procedure was
(Rev. Proc. 2002-75). These
rulings came more than a year after Rev. Rul. 2001-31 declared obsolete both Rev. Rul. 77-316,
1977-2 CB 52, which, in general, sought to deny deductions for premiums between
affiliated entities (both parent entities and operating affiliates) and
captives, and Rev. Rul. 88-72 which, in general, sought to disregard the
presence of unrelated business in determining whether premium paid for related
risk was deductible.
On July 5, 2005,
the US Internal Revenue Service issued
Revenue Rule 2005-40 in
Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 2005-27.
On July 23,
2007, the US Internal Revenue Service issued
Revenue Rule 2007-47 in
Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 2007-30
.
Set forth below is a brief discussion of these
revenue rulings and procedures.
Rev. Rul. 2002-89
- ( Parent Premium Deductibility, The 50% Unrelated
Risk Rule, and "7 Other Factors" )
Rev. Rul. 2002-89 considers two situations. In the first, P, a domestic entity,
enters into an insurance contract with its subsidiary, S, to insure the
professional liability risks of P (either directly or as a reinsurer). S is
regulated as an insurer in each state in which it does business. The premiums
paid by P to S under the insurance/reinsurance contracts are established
according to customary industry rating formulas, and P and S conduct themselves
consistently with the standards applicable to an arm’s-length insurance
arrangement. S writes similar contracts for unrelated parties, and the premiums
paid by unrelated parties also are based on customary industry rating formulas.
P does not provide any guarantee of S’ performance and all funds and business
records of P and S are separately maintained. S does not loan any funds to P.
The premiums S earns from the contracts with P constitute 90% of S’
earned premium on a net and gross basis, and the coverage provided to P
accounts for 90% of the total risks borne by S.
In the second situation, the
facts are the same except that P’s premiums constitute less than 50% of
the net and gross earned premiums. The liability coverage S provides to P
accounts for less than 50% of the total risks borne by S.
Although the premiums are found not to be deductible in the first (90%)
fact pattern, the IRS held that they were deductible in the second. Rev. Rul.
2002-89 seems to provide a safe harbor The 50% rule that can be
inferred from the ruling is based on a number of field service advices that the
IRS has published during the last few years and the IRS’ reference in Rev. Rul.
2001-31 to reviewing ‘other factors’ in determining whether premium paid to a
captive insurer is deductible as premium in the year in which it is paid. Set
forth below is a brief analysis of seven (7) so-called `other factors’.
1. Guarantees In a number of cases, the courts have denied a
deduction for premiums paid if a parental guaranty, hold harmless agreement or
similar arrangement was in place with respect to the obligations of the
insurance subsidiary. See, e.g., Malone & Hyde Inc v Commissioner, 62 F.3rd 835
(6th Cir. 1995), rev’g 66 TCM 1551, and Kidde Industries Inc v United States, 40
Fed Cl. 42 (1997). Accordingly, Rev. Rul. 2002-89 posits that such arrangements
are not in place.
2. Loan backs Rev. Rul. 2002-89 posits no loan backs to P. In several field service advices
(see, e.g., FSA 200202002), the IRS has taken the position that loans from the
insurance subsidiary to the parent or other affiliates may affect deductibility
(although the IRS has indicated that a loan of a significant portion of premiums
by a captive to a finance affiliate that is not insured by the captive may not
adversely affect the premium deductibility analysis in FSA 199945009).
3. Unrelated premium tested on both a net
and gross earned basis There have been four cases
which have specifically held that the introduction of unrelated business in
sufficient amounts results in a deduction for related business that might
otherwise not be deductible, see The Harper Group v Commissioner, 96 T.C. 45,
aff’d 979 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co v United
States, 988 F.2d 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1993); AMERCO, Inc v Commissioner, 97 F.2d 162
(9th Cir. 1992); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 61, aff’d in
part, rev’d in part 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992). The cases, however, all dealt
with a comparison of related and unrelated premium on a gross basis, i.e., no
reinsurance of either the net or gross premium was discussed. Clearly, the IRS
is taking the position that ratios of unrelated business to total business must
be tested on both a net and gross basis. Thus, for example, if an insurance
subsidiary were to write US$100x of related premium and US$100x of unrelated
premium and retrocede or reinsure the US$100x of unrelated premium to an
unrelated party, the IRS would conclude that since no net unrelated premiums
were retained there could be no deduction for related business based on the
gross amount of unrelated business assumed. In addition, the IRS seems to be
making clear that they will be applying the test on an earned basis,
accordingly, e.g., writing substantial amounts of unrelated premium on the last
day of the year would not normally result in a deduction for related premium as
little of the unrelated premium would be earned at year-end. When these factors
are combined with the requirement of homogeneity of risk discussed immediately
below, it seems clear that the IRS has attempted to tighten the mechanics for
measuring unrelated risk.
4. Homogeneity of risk The
IRS has in at least one field service advice (FSA
1998-578) indicated that unrelated business must be of the same kind (here all
is professional liability). Hence, Rev. Rul. 2002-89 posits that all of the
risks are of one kind.
5. Liability analysis This seems to be a new ‘other factor’ (it is not discussed in recent field
service advices), i.e., that the liability risks borne by S comport with the
premium analysis. Thus, the IRS might argue if an amount of premium for related
risk is equal to unrelated premium, but the related risk assumed is an excess
cover giving rise to a greater exposure of limits, it could question the
deduction for the premium paid.
6. Quantum of unrelated risk Rev. Rul. 2002-89 also looks to amount of unrelated risk. In general, a number
of cases have indicated that premium ceded from a parent to an insurance
subsidiary was not deductible but premium paid by an operating subsidiary to an
insurance subsidiary was deductible, see, e.g., in general, Humana, Inc v
Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989), Kidde, supra, Hospital
Corporation of America v Commissioner, 74 TCM 1020 (1997). However, the Harper
case, supra, held that if approximately 30% of premium was unrelated, a
deduction would be afforded to the related party for premium that could not
qualify under the Humana line of cases, e.g., that paid by its parent. Comparing
Situation 1 at 10% in which no deduction is allowed and 50% in Situation 2 in which a deduction is allowed, the
IRS is establishing
another safe harbor and, perhaps indicating a grey area as far as it is
concerned (notwithstanding Harper) below the 50% level of unrelated
premium.
7. Arm’s-length premium according to customary industry formulas and normal
insurance practices Clearly the IRS is indicating that premiums cannot be arbitrary, and it may be
inferred that the IRS expects an actuarial determination to be used to set
premiums. In FSA 200202002, the IRS National Office indicates that loose
attention to the structures of an insured/insurer relationship would not be a
helpful factor in determining premium deductibility. In this ruling, the IRS
indicates that both related and unrelated premium are based on customary
industry formulas, and that P and S conduct themselves in a manner similar to
standards applicable to an insurance arrangement between unrelated parties
(e.g., separation of funds and business records of P and S, and no loan-back
from S to P).
Rev. Rul. 2002-90
- (12 Brother Sister Insureds each accounting for 5% to
15% of the total risk insured )
Rul. 2002-90 establishes further safe harbors. It involves a domestic holding
company with 12 operating subsidiaries, which have a `significant volume of
independent homogeneous risks.’ P, the parent, also owns S, a domestic insurer
formed for a valid non-tax business purpose and licensed in each of the states
in which its 12 operating subsidiaries have operations. S is adequately
capitalized. Each operating subsidiary is charged an arm's length premium
according to customary industry formulas. None of the operating subsidiaries
have liability coverage for less than 5% nor more than 15% of
the total risk insured by S. There are no guarantees of S’ obligations by P or
any related person, and no loans by S to P or to any of the 12 subsidiaries. No
other insurance is written. The risks written are professional liability. The
ruling concludes the arrangements between S and its affiliates is insurance for
federal income tax purposes.
1. Number of insureds
The IRS has in one recent field service advice (FSA
200202002) indicated that the Humana, supra, line of cases applies only where
there are multiple affiliated subsidiaries involved. Clearly, that position is
adopted in Rev. Rul. 2002-90 establishing a safe harbor at 12.
2. Business purpose
Although not specified, the IRS noted that S was formed for a valid non-tax
business purpose.
3. Adequate capitalization
The IRS indicated that P provided S with adequate capital, addressing a
factor in Malone & Hyde, supra, that formed part of the basis for denying the
deduction.
4. Arm’s-length premiums according to customary
industry formulas and normal insurance practices The IRS also noted that the
parties conducted themselves in a manner consistent with standards applicable to
an insurance arrangement between unrelated parties (for example, arm’s-length
premiums, and no parental guarantees or loan-backs to P or 12 operating
subsidiaries).
5. Concentration of risk
Rev. Rul. 2002-90 seems to take the position that no subsidiary should
account for more than 15% of the total risk insured (perhaps this means
that arguments are available that the number of insureds under the safe harbor
could be seven not 12).
Rev. Rul. 2002-91
- ( Group Captives with 7 approximately equal
shareholder/Insureds & Policy Provisions )
Rul. 2002-91 deals with a group captive arrangement. The only published prior
guidance in this area was set forth in Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C. B. 107, which
dealt with a group of 31 unrelated participants. Rev. Rul. 2002-91 deals with a
significantly smaller group of unrelated businesses in one concentrated industry
that face significant liability hazards. Insurance is required by regulators and
affordable insurance is not available from commercial insurers. D, the taxpayer,
and a group of industry members form a group captive, GC, which only writes the
risks of X and the other industry members. No member of GC owns more than 15% of GC and no member has more than
15% of the vote of GC on any
corporate governance issue. Further, no member’s individual risk that is insured
with GC exceeds 15% of the total risk insured by GC. GC uses actuarial
techniques based on, in part, commercial rates for similar risks to
determine premiums to be charged. GC pools all premiums, investigates claims to
determine the validity of claims. No member has an obligation to pay additional
premium if its premium is insufficient to pay its losses for any period, or gets
a refund if its premiums exceed losses. Premiums may be used to settle claims of
other members. If a member terminates coverage or sells its interest in GC, it
is not required to make additional premium payments or capital payments to cover
losses that exceed the premiums it has paid, nor can a member in such
circumstances receive a refund of premium if premium exceeded losses. The
conclusion is that premiums are deductible and that GC is in the business of
issuing insurance policies. Again, the IRS is providing a safe harbor with more
substance than Rev. Rul. 78-338, which did not address the provisions of the
policy.
1. Business purpose The IRS makes clear that they are looking for an
independent business, as distinguished from a tax purpose, in forming the
captive, by reference to the lack of affordable coverage for the industry that
formed the captive.
2. Adequate capitalization
One factor referred to in Malone & Hyde, supra, in denying the
deduction to the operating entities involved was a lack of adequate
capitalization of the captive involved. Here, the IRS indicates capital is
adequate.
a. Size of the group The
IRS seems
to be reducing the safe harbor ‘size’ of the group from the 31 in Rev. Rul.
78-338, to seven approximately equal shareholders/insureds.
b. Arm’s-length premiums using
recognized actuarial techniques and normal insurance practices The
IRS again indicates that premiums cannot be arbitrary, noting that GC uses
recognized actuarial techniques based, in part, on commercial rates for
similar coverage. The IRS again posits normal insurance practices as a
standard, such as investigation of claims before payment and the separation
of GC’s assets and business operations from those of its owners.
c. Policy provisions.
The IRS apparently has become concerned with group captive
policy provisions that could have the effect of reducing or eliminating risk
transfer through:
(a) payment of additional premium by a
member to cover its own losses, and refunding excess premiums paid by a
member so that each member covers its own losses and pooling is
decreased or eliminated;
(b) payment by an insured of
additional amounts on termination of the insurance relationship with the
group captive to cover the insured’s losses or a refund to the insured
of the excess of premiums paid over insured loss. In addition, the IRS
seems to be dealing with cases such as Commissioner v Lincoln Savings &
Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971), and Black Hills Corporation v
Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1996), which dealt with the creation
of a capital asset (deposit account) which the insured would receive on
termination of its insurance relationship net of paid losses.
Rev. Proc. 2002-75 - (
IRS will issue Private Letter Rulings (PLR's) on Captive Insurance Companies regarding the Deductibility
of Premiums paid by insureds to the Captive and whether the Captive entity
will be treated as an insurance company for federal tax purposes )
Finally, the IRS published Rev. Proc. 2002-75, which
indicates that the IRS will now provide guidance through ruling letters on
captives relating to:
i. Whether there is requisite risk
shifting and risk distribution necessary to constitute insurance for
purposes of determining the deductibility of premiums as ordinary and
necessary business expenses: and
ii. Whether the requisite risk shifting
and risk distribution are present for determining whether an entity is an
insurance company for federal income tax purposes.
Although acknowledging that rulings may now be
considered, the Revenue Procedure does note that: “some questions arising in the
context of a captive ruling request are so inherently factual... that contact
should be made with the appropriate Service function prior to the preparation of
such request to determine whether the Service will issue the requested ruling.”
Accordingly, although the topic is off the ‘no ruling list’, the IRS may still
decline to rule based on the facts. The question obviously is whether the IRS
will entertain requests that do not meet all of the requirements of the recently
published revenue rulings or will use these merely as guides in their ruling
posture. (Learn More)
Rev. Rul. 2005–40
- ( Single Member LLC's are Disregarded Entities and
therefore do not count as separate insured brother/sister entities )
Rev. Rule 2005-40 was
issued by the IRS on July 5, 2005 in
Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 2005-27
Do the arrangements described below constitute
insurance for federal income tax purposes? If so, are amounts paid to the issuer
deductible as insurance premiums and does the issuer qualify as an insurance
company?
FACTS
Situation 1. X, a
domestic corporation,
operates a courier transport business covering a large portion of the United
States. X owns and operates a large fleet of automotive vehicles representing a
significant volume of independent, homogeneous risks. For valid, non-tax
business purposes, X entered into an arrangement with Y, an unrelated domestic
corporation, whereby in exchange for an agreed amount of “premiums,” Y “insures”
X against the risk of loss arising out of the operation of its fleet in the
conduct of its courier business. The amount of “premiums” under the arrangement
is determined at arm’s length according to customary insurance industry rating
formulas. Y possesses adequate capital to fulfill its obligations to
X under the
agreement, and in all respects operates in accordance with the applicable
requirements of state law. There are no guarantees of any kind in favor of
Y
with respect to the agreement, nor are any of the “premiums” paid by X to
Y in
turn loaned back to X. X has no obligation to pay Y additional premiums if
X’s
actual losses during any period of coverage exceed the “premiums” paid by X. X
will not be entitled to any refund of “premiums” paid if X’s actual losses are
lower than the “premiums” paid during any period. In all respects, the parties
conduct themselves consistent with the standards applicable to an insurance
arrangement between unrelated parties, except that Y does not “insure” any
entity other than X.
Situation 2. The facts are the same as
in Situation 1 except that, in addition to its arrangement with X,
Y enters into
an arrangement with Z, a domestic corporation unrelated to X or Y, whereby in
exchange for an agreed amount of “premiums,” Y also “insures” Z against the risk
of loss arising out of the operation of its own fleet in connection with the
conduct of a courier business substantially similar to that of X. The amounts Y
earns from its arrangements with Z constitute 10% of Y’s total amounts earned
during the taxable year on both a gross and net basis. The arrangement with Z
accounts for 10% of the total risks borne by Y.
Situation 3. X, a
domestic corporation,
operates a courier transport business covering a large portion of the United
States. X conducts the courier transport business through 12 limited liability
companies (LLCs) of which it is the single member. The LLCs are
disregarded as
entities separate from X under the provisions of § 301.7701–3 of the Procedure
and Administration Regulations. The LLCs own and operate a large fleet of
automotive vehicles, collectively representing a significant volume of
independent, homogeneous risks. For valid, non-tax business purposes, the LLCs
entered into arrangements with Y, an unrelated domestic corporation, whereby in
exchange for an agreed amount of “premiums,” Y “insures” the LLCs against the
risk of loss arising out of the operation of the fleet in the conduct of their
courier business. None of the LLCs account for less than 5%, or more than 15%,
of the total risk assumed by Y under the agreements.
The amount of “premiums” under the arrangement
is determined at arm’s length according to customary insurance industry rating
formulas. Y possesses adequate capital to fulfill its obligations to the
LLCs under the agreement, and in all respects operates in accordance with the
licensing and other requirements of state law. There are no guarantees of any
kind in favor of Y with respect to the agreements, nor are any of the “premiums”
paid by the LLCs to Y in turn loaned back to X or to the
LLCs. No LLC has any
obligation to pay Y additional premiums if that LLC’s actual losses during the
arrangement exceed the “premiums” paid by that LLC. No LLC will be entitled to a
refund of “premiums” paid if that LLC’s actual losses are lower than the
“premiums” paid during any period. Y retains the risks that it assumes under the
agreement. In all respects, the parties conduct themselves consistent with the
standards applicable to an insurance arrangement between unrelated parties,
except that Y does not “insure” any entity other than the LLCs.
Situation 4. The facts are the same as
in Situation 3, except that each of the 12 LLCs elects pursuant to
§
301.7701–3(a) to be classified as an association.
LAW
Section 831(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides that taxes, computed as provided in § 11, are imposed for each taxable
year on the taxable income of each insurance company other than a life insurance
company. Section 831(c) provides that, for purposes of § 831, the term
“insurance company” has the meaning given to such term by § 816(a). Under §
816(a), the term “insurance company” means any company more than half of the
business of which during the taxable year is the issuing of insurance or annuity
contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insurance companies.
Section 162(a) provides, in part, that there
shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. Section
1.162–1(a) of the Income Tax Regulations provides, in part, that among the items
included in business expenses are insurance premiums against fire, storms,
theft, accident, or other similar losses in the case of a business.
Neither the Code nor the regulations define
the terms “insurance” or “insurance contract.” The United States Supreme Court,
however, has explained that in order for an arrangement to constitute insurance
for federal income tax purposes, both risk shifting and risk distribution must
be present. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
The risk transferred must be risk of
economicloss. Allied Fidelity Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978). The risk must contemplate the
fortuitous occurrence of a stated contingency, Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183
F.2d 288, 290–91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950), and must not be
merely an investment or business risk. Le Gierse, at 542; Rev. Rul. 89–96,
1989–2 C.B. 114.
Risk shifting occurs if a person facing the
possibility of an economic loss transfers some or all of the financial
consequences of the potential loss to the insurer, such that a loss by the
insured does not affect the insured because the loss is offset by a payment from
the insurer. Risk distribution incorporates the statistical phenomenon known as
the law of large numbers. Distributing risk allows the insurer to reduce the
possibility that a single costly claim will exceed the amount taken in as
premiums and set aside for the payment of such a claim. By assuming numerous
relatively small, independent risks that occur randomly over time, the insurer
smoothes out losses to match more closely its receipt of premiums. Clougherty
Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1987).
Courts have recognized that risk distribution
necessarily entails a pooling of premiums, so that a potential insured is not in
significant part paying for its own risks. Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner, 881
F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v.
United States, 988 F.2d 1135, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Risk distribution involves
spreading the risk of loss among policyholders.”); Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
United States, 797 F.2d 920, 922 (10th Cir. 1986) (“‘Risk distributing’ means
that the party assuming the risk distributes his potential liability, in part,
among others.”); Treganowan, at 291 (quoting Note, The New York Stock Exchange
Gratuity Fund: Insurance that Isn’t Insurance, 59 Yale L. J. 780, 784 (1950))
(“‘By diffusing the risks through a mass of separate risk shifting contracts,
the insurer casts his lot with the law of averages. The process of risk
distribution, therefore, is the very essence of insurance.’”); Crawford Fitting
Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (“The court finds .
. . that various nonaffiliated persons or entities facing risks similar but
independent of those faced by plaintiff were named insureds under the policy,
enabling the distribution of the risk thereunder.”); AMERCO and Subsidiaries v.
Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18, 41 (1991), aff ’d, 979 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The
concept of risk-distributing emphasizes the pooling aspect of insurance: that it
is the nature of an insurance contract to be part of a larger collection of
coverages, combined to distribute risk between insureds.”).
ANALYSIS
In order to determine the nature of an
arrangement for federal income tax purposes, it is necessary to consider all the
facts and circumstances in a particular case, including not only the terms of
the arrangement, but also the entire course of conduct of the parties. Thus, an
arrangement that purports to be an insurance contract but lacks the requisite
risk distribution may instead be characterized as a deposit arrangement, a loan,
a contribution to capital (to the extent of net value, if any), an indemnity
arrangement that is not an insurance contract, or otherwise, based on the
substance of the arrangement between the parties. The proper characterization of
the arrangement may determine whether the issuer qualifies as an insurance
company and whether amounts paid under the arrangement may be deductible. In
Situation 1, Y enters into an “insurance” arrangement with X. The arrangement
with X represents Y’s only such agreement. Although the arrangement may shift
the risks of X to Y, those risks are not, in turn, distributed among other
insureds or policyholders. Therefore, the arrangement between X and Y does not
constitute insurance for federal income tax purposes. In Situation 2, the fact
that Y also enters into an arrangement with Z does not change the conclusion
that the arrangement between X and Y lacks the requisite risk distribution to
constitute insurance. Y’s contract with Z represents only 10% of the total
amounts earned by Y, and 10% of total risks assumed, under all its arrangements.
This creates an insufficient pool of other premiums to distribute X’s risk. See
Rev. Rul. 2002–89, 2002–2 C.B. 984 (concluding that risks from unrelated parties
representing 10% of total risks borne by subsidiary are insufficient to qualify
arrangement between parent and subsidiary as insurance).
In Situation 3, Y contracts only with
12
single member LLC's through which X conducts a courier transport business. The
LLC's are disregarded as entities separate from X pursuant to § 301.7701–3.
Section 301.7701–2(a) provides that if an entity is disregarded, its activities
are treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch or division of
the owner. Applying this rule in Situation 3, Y has entered into an “insurance”
arrangement only with X. Therefore, for the reasons set forth in Situation 1
above, the arrangement between X and Y does not constitute insurance for federal
income tax purposes.
In Situation 4, the 12 LLC's are not
disregarded as entities separate from X, but instead are classified as
associations for federal income tax purposes. The arrangements between Y and
each LLC thus shift a risk of loss from each LLC to Y. The risks of the LLC's
are distributed among the various other LLC's that are insured under similar
arrangements. Therefore the arrangements between the 12 LLC's and Y constitute
insurance for federal income tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 2002–90, 2002–2 C.B.
985 (similar arrangements between affiliated entities constituted insurance).
Because the arrangements with the 12 LLC's represent Y’s only business, and
those arrangements are insurance contracts for federal income tax purposes, Y is
an insurance company within the meaning of §§ 831(c) and 816(a). In addition,
the 12 LLC's may be entitled to deduct amounts paid under those arrangements as
insurance premiums under § 162 if the requirements for deduction are otherwise
satisfied.
HOLDINGS
In Situations 1, 2 and 3, the arrangements
do
not constitute insurance for federal income tax purposes.
In Situation 4, the arrangements constitute
insurance for federal income tax purposes and the issuer qualifies as an
insurance company. The amounts paid to the issuer may be deductible as insurance
premiums under § 162 if the requirements for deduction are otherwise satisfied.
In this ruling, the IRS is providing
further guidance regarding the amount of risk distribution which must be present
in order for transaction to constitute insurance. Specifically, the IRS requires
the presence of a "large number of independent homogenous risks" as well
as an adequate number of independent insureds. The term homogenous refers
to the extent to which risks are similar with regard to line, limit, premium
rate, liability layer, term, etc. The question of how many risks are
needed to constitute a "large number of independent homogenous risks" is not
defined however, the IRS will accept the opinion of a licensed actuary regarding
whether or not the number of risks insured is sufficient to permit the
application of the "law of large numbers" and statistical inference. The
IRS does however, reaffirm the safe harbor set forth in
Rev. Rul. 2002-90
that there must be at least 12 domestic corporate insureds; no one of which may
account for less than 5% or more than 15% of the total risk assumed by the
insurer.
The case of a Limited Liability Company with a
single member that did not make an election to be taxed as an association i.e..
"Corporation" for tax purposes also reinforces the fact that all of the
IRS Safe Harbor rulings listed on this page have dealt with insurers and
insureds who are domestic corporations, not partnerships, subchapter S
corporations, or sole proprietorships, trusts, etc for US tax purposes. In cases
where the insureds are not domestic US corporations for tax purposes, the IRS
will probably look closely at the ownership % of each shareholder, partner, etc.
in an attempt to argue that an insured entity although not technically
disregarded pursuant to § 301.7701–3, should none the less be be
indistinguishable from its owner. Under this strategy, otherwise separate
pass through entities which are insureds, could be consolidated by ownership and
thereby fail to meet the minimum of 12 separate entities, no one of which
accounts for less than 5% or more than 15% of the risks assumed by the insurer.
A brief summary of the options which are available to a Limited Liability
Company regarding how it will be classified for US tax purposes appears
below.
A Limited
liability company (LLC) is an entity
organized under the laws of a state or foreign country as a limited
liability company. For Federal tax purposes, an LLC may be treated as a
partnership or corporation or be disregarded as an entity separate from its
owner.
By
default, a domestic LLC with only one member is
disregarded as an entity separate from its
owner and must include all of its income and expenses on the owner's tax
return (e.g., Schedule C (Form 1040)). Also
by default, a domestic LLC with two or more members is treated as a
partnership. A domestic LLC may file Form 8832,
Entity Classification Election to avoid either default classification
and elect to be classified as an association taxable as a corporation.
Insurance premium.
This ruling holds that an arrangement that provides for the
reimbursement of inevitable future costs does not involve
the requisite insurance risk for purposes of determining (i)
whether the amount paid for the arrangement is deductible as
an insurance premium and (ii) whether the assuming entity
may account for the arrangement as an ‘insurance contract’
for purposes of subchapter L of the Code. Stakeholders are
asked to comment on the application of the rationale of the
revenue ruling outside of its facts. Rev. Rul. 89-96
amplified.
Does the
arrangement described below involve the requisite insurance
risk to constitute insurance for purposes of determining (i)
whether X may deduct
the amount paid under the arrangement as an “insurance
premium” under § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, and (ii)
whether IC may
account for the arrangement as an “insurance contract” for
purposes of subchapter L of the Code?
X, a
domestic corporation that uses an accrual method of
accounting, is engaged in a Business Process that is
inherently harmful to people and property. Applicable
governmental regulations require
X to take action to remediate that harm. Doing
so will require X to
incur Future Costs to undertake specific measures to restore
X’s business location
to its condition before Business Process began; the Future
Costs will be incurred when X
ceases to engage in Business Process. The exact amount and
timing of the Future Costs are a function of many factors,
including the future cost of wages, future cost of
materials, future changes in the regulation of Business
Process, and the timing of X’s
discontinuation of Business Process. There is no
uncertainty, however, that the Future Costs will be
incurred.
When
X began Business
Process in Year 1, it estimated that the present value of
Future Costs was $150x,
based on its evaluation of the factors identified above and
an appropriate discount rate based on economic projections.
At that time, X
entered into an arrangement with
IC, an unrelated domestic insurance company
taxable under § 831. Under the arrangement,
X agreed to pay
IC $150x,
and IC agreed to
reimburse X for its
Future Costs, up to a limit of $300x.
The arrangement had no limits on its duration.
Section 162(a)
provides, in part, that there shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. Section 1.162-1(a) of the Income Tax Regulations
provides, in part, that among the items included in
deductible business expenses are insurance premiums against
fire, storm, theft, accident, or other similar losses in the
case of a business.
Section 461
provides that the amount of any deduction shall be taken for
the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under the
method of accounting used by the taxpayer in computing
taxable income. Under § 1.461-1(a)(2), a liability is
incurred and generally is taken into account under an
accrual method of accounting in the taxable year in which
all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the
liability, the amount of the liability can be determined
with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has
occurred with respect to the liability. Section
1.461-4(g)(5) provides that if a liability arises out of the
provision to the taxpayer of insurance, economic performance
occurs as payment is made to the person to which the
liability is owed. If the period of coverage extends
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year, however,
the amount permitted to be taken into account in the year of
payment is determined under the capitalization rules of
§ 263. Section 1.461-4(g)(8)(Ex. 6); § 1.263-4(d)(3)(i).
Characterization of an arrangement as insurance has
consequences for the issuer, as well. Section 831(a)
provides that taxes, computed as provided in § 11, are
imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of each
insurance company other than a life insurance company.
Section 832(a) provides that for this purpose, taxable
income means the gross income as defined in § 832(b)(1) less
the deductions allowed by § 832(c). Gross income includes
underwriting income, which is defined in § 832(b)(3) as
premiums earned on insurance contracts during the taxable
year, less losses incurred and expenses incurred. Premiums
earned and losses incurred on insurance contracts are
computed taking into account reserves for unearned premiums
under § 832(b)(4) and for discounted unpaid losses under
§ 832(b)(5), respectively. If an arrangement is not an
insurance contract, no reserves are permitted for unearned
premiums or for discounted unpaid losses with respect to the
arrangement. Even if an arrangement is an insurance
contract, no reserve is permitted for discounted unpaid
losses until a loss has been “incurred.”
Neither the
Code nor the regulations define the terms “insurance” or
“insurance contract.” The Supreme Court of the United States
has explained that in order for an arrangement to constitute
insurance for federal income tax purposes, both risk
shifting and risk distribution must be present.
Helvering v. Le Gierse,
312 U.S. 531 (1941). The risk transferred must be risk of
economic loss. Allied Fidelity
Corp. v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th
Cir. 1978). The risk must contemplate the fortuitous
occurrence of a stated contingency,
Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288,
290-91 (2d Cir. 1950), and must not be merely an investment
or business risk. Le Gierse,
312 U.S. at 542; Rev. Rul. 89-96, 1989-2 C.B. 114.
In
Le Gierse, the Court
found that complementary annuity and insurance contracts did
not involve an insurance risk but rather an investment risk
because the risk assumed by the issuer was only that the
amount the taxpayer paid for the contracts would earn less
than the amount paid to the taxpayer as an annuity; the
total amount paid by the taxpayer exceeded the face value of
the life insurance contract. This risk, the Court said, “was
an investment risk similar to the risk assumed by a bank; it
was not an insurance risk.” Le
Gierse, 312 U.S. at 542.
In
Treganowan, the court
held that a program under which the surviving members of the
New York Stock Exchange paid a certain sum to the families
of deceased members constituted insurance; the court
distinguished the holding of Le Gierse
as follows:
The
holding [of Le Gierse]
really highlights the situation here where the
payment is actually conditioned upon death, whenever
occurring, in the true terms of insurance. “From an
insurance standpoint there is no risk unless there
is uncertainty, or, to use a better term,
fortuitousness. It may be uncertain whether the risk
will materialize in any particular case. Even death
may be considered fortuitous, because the time of
its occurrence is beyond control.” 8 Ency.Soc.Sc.
95. That fortuitousness, whether we speak of death
generally or premature death, as the Tax Court
wished to emphasize, seems perfectly embodied here
to fit both branches of the Supreme Court’s test.
Treganowan,
183 F.2d at 290-91. See also
Allied Fidelity Corp., 572 F.2d at 1193 (“[T]he
insurer undertakes no present duty of performance but stands
ready to assume financial burden of any covered loss,”
citing Couch on Insurance § 1:2 (1959)).
The Supreme
Court has applied a similar standard to determine what
constitutes “the business of insurance” for purposes of
§ 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34, as
amended, 61 Stat. 448, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). In
Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979), the
Court concluded that agreements between Blue Shield of Texas
and three pharmacies for the provision of prescription drugs
to Blue Shield policyholders did not constitute “the
business of insurance” within the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, noting that “[t]he primary elements
of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting
of a policyholder’s risk.” The Court considered the
legislative history of the Act, quoting approvingly from one
of the early House Reports, as follows: “‘The theory of
insurance is the distribution of risk according to hazard,
experience, and the laws of averages. These factors are not
within the control of insuring companies in the sense that
the producer or manufacturer may control cost factors.’”
Group Life & Health Ins. Co.,
440 U.S. at 221 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess., 8-9 (1943)). Non-tax insurance treatises further
confirm that arrangements entered into to manage losses that
are at least substantially certain to occur, or that are not
the result of fortuitous events, do not constitute
insurance. See,
e.g.,
Couch on Insurance,
§ 102:8 (losses that exist at the time of the insuring
agreement, or that are so probable or imminent that there is
insufficient “risk” being transferred between the insured
and insurer, are not proper subjects of insurance); 1
Appleman on Insurance 2d,
§ 1.4 (“The fortuity principle is central to the notion of
what constitutes insurance. The insurer will not and should
not be asked to provide coverage for a loss that is
reasonably certain or expected to occur within the policy
period.”); 43 Am. Jur. 2d
Insurance, § 479 (2005).
See also Warren Freedman,
Freedman’s Richards on Insurance
§ 1:2 (6th ed. 1990) (insurance is an aleatory
contract); Restatement (First) of
Contracts § 291 (1932) (aleatory contract is one
premised on happening of fortuitous event; that time or
amount of performance depends on fortuitous event does not
mean contract is aleatory).
In Rev. Rul.
89-96, 1989-2 C.B. 114, Y,
a taxpayer that had already experienced a catastrophic loss,
entered into a “liability insurance” contract with
Z, an unrelated
casualty insurance company. The exact amount of
Y’s liability to
injured persons as a result of the catastrophe could not be
ascertained, but was expected to be substantially in excess
of $130x. At the time the catastrophe occurred,
Y’s liability
insurance coverage totaled $30x. Under the contract between
Y and
Z,
Y paid a premium of
$50x in exchange for additional “liability insurance”
coverage of $100x. That is, Z
promised to pay on behalf of Y
amounts in excess of $30x for which
Y would become liable, subject to the
contract’s limit of $100x. The $50x “premium” charged
Y was an amount that,
together with Z’s
investment earnings and tax savings, would yield at least
Z’s maximum
anticipated liability of $100x by the time claims were
liquidated. The ruling concludes that the arrangement does
not involve the requisite risk shifting necessary for
insurance, because the catastrophe had already occurred and
the economic terms of the contract demonstrate the absence
of any risk apart from an investment risk (that is, the risk
Z would be required
to pay out $100x earlier than anticipated, or that actual
investment yield would be lower than forecast).
In order to
determine the nature of an arrangement for federal income
tax purposes, it is necessary to consider all the facts and
circumstances in a particular case, including not only the
terms of the arrangement, but also the entire course of
conduct of the parties. Thus, an arrangement that purports
to be an insurance contract but that lacks the requisite
insurance risk, or fortuity, may instead be characterized as
a deposit arrangement, a loan, a contribution to capital (to
the extent of net value, if any), an option or indemnity
contract, or otherwise, based on the substance of the
arrangement between the parties. The proper characterization
of the arrangement may determine whether the issuer
qualifies as an insurance company and whether amounts paid
under the arrangement may be deductible.
In the present
case, the requirement that X
incur Future Costs attached at the time
X began Business
Process; no insurance risk or hazard, such as a hurricane or
an accident, exists as to whether
X will have to incur those costs; it is
certain that IC will
have to perform under the arrangement with
X by reimbursing
X for the costs
incurred to perform the measures, subject to the contract
limit of $300x.
Economically, the arrangement is a prefunding by
X of its future
obligations. Although IC
assumed the risks of (i) the scope of the required measures,
(ii) projections of future labor and material costs, (iii)
the likely time frame when Future Costs would be incurred,
and (iv) an appropriate discount rate based on projections
of future investment earnings, the overall risk assumed by
IC was whether the
estimated present value of the cost of performing the
measures ($150x) would accrue to exceed the greater of
X’s costs to perform
the required measures or the contract limit of $300x. This
risk is akin to the timing and investment risks that Rev.
Rul. 89-96 concludes are not insurance risks. Accordingly,
the arrangement between X
and IC lacks the
requisite insurance risk to constitute insurance under the
authorities set forth above.
The
arrangement between X
and IC lacks the
requisite insurance risk to constitute insurance for
purposes of determining (i) whether
X may deduct the amount paid under the
arrangement as an “insurance premium” under § 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code, and (ii) whether
IC may account for
the arrangement as an “insurance contract” for purposes of
subchapter L of the Code.
Rev. Rul.
89-96, 1989-2 C.B. 114, is amplified.
A revenue
ruling represents the conclusion of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) on the application of the law to the pivotal
facts stated therein. Accordingly, this revenue ruling does
not apply to reinsurance arrangements (including retroactive
reinsurance, such as loss portfolio transfers), arrangements
covering unanticipated environmental exposures, arrangements
covering unanticipated cost overruns, or arrangements
involving product warranties. The IRS may apply, or not
apply, the authorities cited in this ruling to such
arrangements, according to the facts and circumstances
presented on a case-by-case basis. Comments are requested
concerning the need for guidance in these and other areas.
Comments should be submitted by October 22, 2007. Comments
may be submitted by mail addressed to: Internal Revenue
Service, CC:PA:LPD:PR (Rev. Rul. 2007-47), P.O. Box 7604,
Ben Franklin Station, Washington, DC 20044; by hand delivery
(Monday through Friday between the hours of 8:00 a.m.
through 4:00 p.m.) addressed to: Courier’s Desk, Internal
Revenue Service, Attn.: CC:PA:LPD:PR (Rev. Rul. 2007-47),
Room 5203, 1111 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20224; or by email addressed to:
Notice.Comments@irscounsel.treas.gov.
Commentators should include the identification number of the
publication (Rev. Rul. 2007-47) in both the email subject
line and the body of the comment.
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